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ORBITING SENTINELS FOR SECURITY 
Lt. Col. Stanley G. Rosen
NOTE; THE OPINIONS CONTAINED IN THIS ARTICLE REPRESENT THE VIEWS 
OF THE AUTHOR, AND DO NOT NESESSARILY REPRESENT THE POSITION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
INTRODUCTION
For the past forty years, the threat of retaliation has been 
the foundation of our national security strategy. This threat has 
been the basis of the deterrent strategy which has helped maintain 
a relatively peaceful relationship between the world's major 
powers. However, this strategy has also led to an expensive and 
possibly dangerous need to maintain large numbers of nuclear and 
conventional weapons around the world.
These difficulties with retaliatory deterrence are the main 
reason for many of the alternative strategies which are being 
considered. One alternative is to move beyond threat in 
structuring our national security posture. New technical and 
political opportunities may now make promoting mutual security 
rather than mutual threat a realistic means of protecting our 
Interests.
The advent and political acceptance of on-site- and 
space-based sensors and observers to verify compliance with arms 
control agreements has opened a new era of global stability and 
security. At the same time as nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missiles were being perfected, space-based observation systems 
were also coming to maturity. On the other hand, the provision 
for on-site observers to monitor treaty compliance on a large 
scale is a relatively recent phenomenon in the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship.
• First used to observe the earth's natural resources and to
monitor arms control agreements, space-based sensors have injected 
new stability into international relationships. Orbiting sensors 
which can see deeply and constantly Into the territory of all 
nations can provide early warning of impending hostilities, 3y 
being able to detect threats at their source, in the homeland of 
•the potential aggressor, space sensors are helping make 
large-scale surprise attack an artifact of the past. With 
improved Information regarding a potential adversary's military 
activities, military responses can be planned and executed, with 
greater precision, avoiding much of the overreact ion which led to 
inadvertant escalation In past conflicts. Finally, the existence 
of'these sensor capabilities has acted to deter conflict: a 
potential aggressor knows he is being watched.
The fact that space sensors can detect missile launches as 
soon as they occur has formed the backbone of our current nuclear
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deterrent strategy since the 1960 f s. It is precisely because space 
sensors can provide early warning of missile attack that the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union can today credibly threaten retaliation 
against any nuclear attacker. Without this early warning, the 
threat of retaliation would be hollow. Adequate warning, based on 
information from space, is the key to our current strategy of 
nuclear deterrence.
At the same time as orbiting observation systems are 
maturing, the growing political acceptability of on-site observers 
on the ground also offers a powerful new tool for maintaining 
confidence that threats are understood. When used in combination 
with space-based observation systems, they provide a unique abilty 
to detect and identify emerging threats, and' thereby discourage 
the development of such threats in the first place.
Orbiting sensors can survey wide areas repeatedly, looking 
for changes or other indicators that suspicious activity may be 
occuring. They cannot, however, look into buildings or produce 
detailed inspections of suspected weapon developments. These 
latter steps can be performed by on-site observers, who themselves 
must be cued by sensors which can survey broad areas repeatedly, 
from orbit, On-site observers must use satellite communication 
links to quickly and securely report their findings to their home 
countries.
T.hese new information gathering and evaluation capabilities 
offer to revolutionize the strategies by which nations maintain 
their security. In the process, they may offer the first really 
new concept for global stability in forty years.
BACKGROUND
Since the end of World War II, the United States and the 
Soviet Union have maintained weapons of mass destruction whose 
primary purpose is mutual threat. The unprecedented investment of 
national wealth in systems for strategic warfare has produced a 
massive stockpile of weapons and destructive capability never 
before imagined. These weapons have successfully maintained a 
relatively stable global environment for the past four decades, 
based on their ability to deter conflict by threatening 
unacceptable retaliation.
Unfortunately, this is a very expensive strategy, and one 
that many feel we cannot afford. A credible deterrent requires 
the ability to conduct warfare at whatever level is deemed 
appropriate to the situation; thus the concept of "flexible 
response." To conduct extended warfare as one escalates through 
increasing levels of nuclear employment requires command, control, 
and communications systems and the weapons they support to be 
designed for unprecedented punishment. The morale and obedience of 
the troops must be unquestionable if they are to provide a 
credible nuclear warfighting force. Finally, there must be some 
sort of economic infrastructure to support the country during such
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an extended conflict.
Our concept of strategic warfare also forms the backbone of 
"extended deterrence 11 , a concept by which our global interests, 
including the security of our allies, is "guaranteed" by the 
threat that we can and will attack the Soviet Union, if adequately 
provoked. Most specifically, this concept of extended deterrence 
has come to underlie our commitment to the defense of our European 
allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Extended deterrence promises to protect our European allies 
by offering the possibility of nuclear response to an attack on 
our allies. In the first order, nuclear weapons could be used to 
blunt a conventional attack from the Warsaw Pact, if our 
conventional forces could not do the job. The very possibility of 
such a response has helped maintain deterrence in Europe. Of 
course, this defense itself could bring unparalleled destruction 
to the continent, and to the homelands of our allies in 
particular. Thus, the strategy of nuclear defense of Europe 
appears to contain the latent seeds of its own demise.
The next step in this strategy would be the launching of 
nuclear weapons from the United States against the Soviet Union 
itself, in an attempt to dissuade them from continued aggression 
in Europe. That such action could lead directly to global nuclear 
holocaust has been long and widely recognized.
It has even been postulated by various scientists that the
detonation of even a "few" nuclear weapons (on the order of a 
hundred) could raise enough soot, ash and smoke into the
atmosphere to block the sun and dramatically lower the world's 
temperature. Even though this theory has not been fully
substantiated, this possibility of "nuclear winter" adds to the 
obvious question: what clash of interests between, the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union could justify the destruction which would be caused 
by; such, a conflict?
It is extremely hard to justify warfare which leads to such 
outcomes, and both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R* know it. Nuclear 
warfare cannot be won and should not be fought, in. the words of 
former President Reagan* And. the concept of extended deterrence, 
'whose credibility rests in turn on the credibility of a global 
nuclear conflict, is being challenged. As a minimum, we would 
prefer a situation in which our survival was under our own 
control. For these reasons, strategies which seem to have worked 
for four decades are being reexamined.
Of course, many believe that we could have no quarrel with 
the Soviets that would conceivably justify using nuclear weapons
to destroy each other 1 s homeland. It is difficult to conceive of 
a-situation in which rational men and. women would decide to 
unleash the total destructive capacity now residing in our nuclear
arsenals* For very good reasons, neither side is likely to 
intentionally initiate a nuclear conflict with the other.
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The problem is, of course, that men and women are not always 
rational, nor are they always in control of events. That is one 
of the sobering lessons of history. Therefore, the very existence 
of these tens of thousands of nuclear weapons could be one of the 
greatest real threats to the security of the world today.- 
Accidents, miscalculations and other forms of unintended 
catastrophe can happen.
These are only the most obvious issues which must be solved 
if a credible deterrent is to rest on a strategy of flexible 
response and protracted conflict. It is not surprising, then, that 
this strategy has been met with a large degree of skepticism, at 
both the professional and political levels, not to mention growing 
concern about its validity by the public.
As a possible alternative security arrangement, it is not 
hard to envision a set of international relationships in which all 
major powers would at all times feel that their basic security was 
protected. In the case of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, this 
would mean that the primary reason for maintaining nuclear forces, 
to deter attack on each other, would no longer exist. In such a 
defense-dominant relationship, the threat to the homeland of each 
country would be minimized.
If our allies were also confident that they, too, were much 
less susceptable to rapid, devastating attack, the need to 
maintain a policy of extended deterrence would be significantly 
reduced.
A framework for mutual security, would rely more heavily on 
defensive strategies which seek to protect rather than to 
threaten. Therefore, such strategies are less likely to provoke 
an "arms race" and lead to an endless quest to keep others under 
threat.
Of course, even in a power balance more heavily characterized 
by defenses, tactical offensive capabilities will still be needed, 
as long as warfare is a possibility. The offense is a key element 
of any military action, and such capabilities should not be 
denied. However, the move to defensive strategies could reduce 
the need for massive, swift-acting offensive forces, and, in the 
process, could reduce the possibility of conflict.
At the same time, the move away from a large retaliatory 
strategic force structure could allow our offensive forces to be 
better focused toward tactical war-fighting needs, aimed at the 
many and varied kinds of threats which will likely face the 
military in the coming years.
The challenge, then, is to find a proper context for building 
a security relationship which avoids the undesirable features of 
the deterrent posture analyzed above. The "win-win" approach of 
mutual security seems to offer one such possibility.
Once we have accepted the premise that we do not have to
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threaten a potential adversary to properly manage our side of the 
relationship, then we can begin to consider ways to strengthen our 
security without provoking others in the process.
This, then, is an alternative strategy to mutual deterrence 
based on retaliation. It is a strategy which could lead to a real 
reduction of tensions and to greater security for the world's 
major powers, and, in turn, for the entire planet. It represents 
a commitment to mutual security from imminent massive destruction 
for all the world's people. In this context, a move toward a more 
defense-oriented strategy makes sense.
INFORMATION FOR STABLE SECURITY
The objective of mutual security would be to create and 
maintain a situation in which no world power possesses enough 
destructive power to inflict unacceptable damage on another. To 
arrive at such an arrangement would require all major powers to 
recognize that mutual security is in fact in their common 
interest.
The critical and often under-appreciated link in this 
transition, however, is the need for information. To be mutually 
secure, all nations must have confidence that their potential 
adversary or adversaries do not possess the ability to overwhelm 
their own organic defenses. To achieve this confidence, it is 
essential that each country use available information gathering 
capabilities to ensure itself that its potential adversary did 
not, in fact, retain enough weapons to pose an unacceptable 
threat. Verifiable confidence, not threat, then, would become the 
basis for security.
In theater warfare such as Europe, space sensors will also be 
the key to maintaining defenses which are not provocative. What we 
call a European "theater" war is, of course, homeland or strategic 
conflict to the Europeans. The same logic applies here as it does 
to U.S./Soviet homeland warfare, except that the distances and, 
therefore, attack times are much shorter. The goal is to establish 
defenses which do not threaten the homeland of either side.
Clearly, in locations such as Western Europe, the possibility 
exists to replace offensive weapons with more defensively oriented 
ones. Although there is probably no such thing as a purely 
"offensive" or "defensive" weapon, for the purposes of this 
discussion offensive weapons are such systems as tanks, missiles, 
and attack aircraft. Defensive weapons include anti-tank weapons, 
mines and passive devices such as barriers. Use of more defensive 
oriented weapons in Europe is a strategic concept which has been 
thoroughly examined elsewhere.
Of course, since "offensive" weapons would be needed to 
respond in case of attack, they must be available. The concern for 
security arises when they are positioned so as to pose an 
immediate threat to other nations, and must therefore be countered 
by opposing deployments of the other side, creating the kind of
potential instabilty we are trying to avoid. Thus, a parameter of 
interest in theater force deployments is not only the kind of 
weapons used, but also their location.
Remembering that the objective of mutual security is to 
reduce or eliminate the immediate threat to each country's 
homeland, and thereby promote its sense of security, it appears 
desirable that weapons capable of such an attack be removed from 
the immediate vicinity of potential hostilities, so as not to pose 
an immediate threat.
The answer to the long standing dilemma of how to provide 
defenses which can respond quickly to a developing threat but do 
not themselves pose an immediate threat to the other side is early 
warning. This warning time is the primary requirement for 
mobilizing or moving defenses into position, assuming that the 
threatening forces were deployed well behind the threatened region 
prior to their call-up.
Arms control regimes which move threatening forces away from 
areas of immediate contention would therefore promote stability in 
such•"theaters". Basing force structures on warning-oriented 
strategies, where warning can be certain and accurate, would thus 
help eliminate tensions in some of the most contested areas of the 
planet.
Of course, weapons alone, offensive or defensive, cannot, 
guarantee peace. Peace and stability can only be maintained by 
methods which address the underlying issues which precipitate 
conflict. Unless the diplomatic, humanitarian, political, social 
and economic instruments of statehood are brought to bear on their 
root causes, strife and conflict are inevitable. The best the 
military can hope for is to create a situation which maintains a 
stable peace long enough for other, non-violent methods of 
resolving conflicts to be effective.
What we are finding is that the ability to provide such 
information is developing rapidly, significantly improving our 
opportunity to develop new security strategies. The options 
described here would not have been possible only a few years ago; 
the information gathering, dissemination and processing 
capabilities these options require were not yet available. Now 
they are, and the new strategic concepts they enable should be 
identified and assessed.
INFORMATION SOURCES
For nations to rely on information f-or warning of emerging 
threats, there must be a high degree of- confidence that the needed 
information will be collected and interpreted correctly in a 
timely manner. Many different types of sensors will be needed to 
minimize the ambiguity of such data. The fact is that the world's 
technical ability to deploy and exploit a wide variety of space 
information gathering capabilities is undergoing revolutionary 
change.
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Whereas, in the past, only a few countries had the ability to 
conduct earth remote sensing from space, this ability is now 
becoming commonplace. Once the exclusive province of the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R., such satellites are now flown by Japan, Europe, 
Canada, India and China, with other entrants in the wings. Over 
20 countries or international organizations plan to fly civil or 
commercial remote sensing satellites in the 1990 f s.
Not only is the number of nations with satellite monitoring 
capabilities increasing rapidly, but the technology to conduct 
such activities is being revolutionized. Newer, more capable, and 
more efficient devices to conduct remote sensing are being 
developed around the world.
In addition, over the past few years, the capability to 
sustain human observers in orbit has dramatically improved. Based 
on the early U.S. and Soviet experimental flights, our 
civilization is experiencing a dramatic step in the evolution of 
humankind, as men and women learn to live in space. Technologies 
represented by the U.S. Skylab and Space Shuttle and the Soviet 
Buran shuttle and Salyut and Mir space stations will continue to 
evolve as the permanent presence of humans in earth orbit becomes 
a reality. Future capabilities, such as the international space 
station program led by the U.S. and evolutionary developments of 
the Soviet systems, will enable human observers to remain 
productive in orbit for increasingly longer periods. With their 
ability to observe large areas quickly, peer through holes between 
clouds, and draw on fine visual acuity, observers in orbit may be 
uniquely able to detect cues which can lead to more detailed 
investigation by remote-sensing satellites or observers on the 
ground.
Newly emerging potentials offer the possibility of being able 
to rapidly and economically observe areas anywhere on earth from 
space, with only minutes notice. Such short- or no-notice 
inspection capability could go a long way toward providing 
necessary confidence that no new threats were developing.
The great potential for information collection offered by 
such orbiting sensors is one of the main reasons they are being 
promoted as useful tools for understanding stresses to the global 
environment and managing global resources. Satellite sensors may 
also be a powerful tool for finding and interdicting drug traffic 
into the United States. Sensor systems used to maintain military 
stability would thus have significant ancillary peacetime benefit.
It is this rapid growth in the ability of the people of this 
planet to observe themselves from a new perspective which gives 
rise to the need to reexamine our concepts of how we organize 
ourselves to face our common challenges. For it is not military 
and traditional security considerations alone which will be 
influenced by these new capabilities. The implications, the 
effects, will be far-reaching indeed.
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CONCLUSION
The advent of space-based information collection and 
dissemination systems has opened new possibilities for 
restructuring international relations. Just as the creation of the 
nuclear-tipped ballistic missile and the long range bomber ushered 
in the era of defense by threat of nuclear retaliation, so has the 
development of orbiting surveillance and communication systems 
enhanced the possibility of security based on confidence. These 
are our new sentinels.
We seem to be moving from a relatively brief period in 
history in which satellite systems have been used to verify 
constraints on or reduction of strategic arms to a period in which 
such weapons may well be inappropriate for maintaining security — 
a shift enabled by the capabilities of those same space-based 
observation devices. Conventional threats in Europe and elsewhere 
would be radically reduced as nations moved away from the threat 
of rapid attack and ground- and space-based observers were 
deployed to provide constant confirmation of mutual security.
.Is cooperation for mutual security possible? We know, for 
example, that the Soviets have often offered to reduce or 
eliminate weapons of various sorts, including missiles, space 
weapons, and ground troops. Our main concern is that we cannot be 
sure that they are sincere, or that such actions could be verified 
or enforced. We worry about a world in which they do not keep 
their agreements. These are valid concerns, of course.
Clearly, the rewards of an effective agreement would be 
great. Such an ideal may seem a simplistic dream, but it is not 
unrealistic to expect the nations of the world to act in ways 
which further their self interest. In many ways, the proposals 
presented here meet that criterion.
Security systems which promote communication, which add time 
and information to strengthen diplomacy and other conflict 
resolution approaches, and which in themselves create national 
wealth are certainly systems worthy of consideration. Systems and 
technologies which are conducive to solving political problems by 
political means, and which encourage cooperation and dialog, 
rather than systems which threaten, may indeed be most conducive 
to long term security, stability and prosperity. These are the 
characteristics of the sentinels in space.
